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THE FRANCHISOR AS "SELLER"
UNDER STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT-
KOSTERS V. SEVEN-UP CO.
Since the initial carving out of the nonfault doctrine of strict liability in
tort in products liability actions, I the majority of jurisdictions in the United
States have declared the marketing of harmful products to be contrary to
public policy. 2 Motivated by predominantly social reasons, those courts
1. The doctrine of strict tort liability for injuries caused by defective products as an alterna-
tive to negligence principles based on fault was first expounded as early as 1944 by Justice
Traynor in the concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150
P.2d 436 (1944). Justice Traynor stated:
I believe the manufacturer's negligence should no longer be singled out as the basis
of a plaintiffs right to recover in cases like the present one. In my opinion it should
now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article
that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings .... Even if there is no
negligence, however, public policy demands that responsibility be fixed where it
will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective
products that reach the market.
Id. at 461-62, 150 P.2d at 440.
In 1962, again through Justice Traynor, the California Supreme Court became the first to
apply the doctrine of strict liability in the landmark case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). For a discussion of the history of
the development of strict liability, see Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel: Strict Liability to the
Consumer, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for
Products, 44 Miss. L. J. 825 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Wade].
2. Thirty-one jurisdictions have expressly accepted strict liability principles-some adopt-
ing the strict liability terminology set forth in Greenman and others retaining the warranty
terminology. State courts' decisions which have adopted strict liability principles are the follow-
ing: Clory v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969); O.S. Stapely Co. v.
Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d
57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Yarthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189
(1965); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1971); Shields v.
Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Il. 2d
612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Cornette v. Serjeant Metals Prods., Inc., 147 Ind. App. 46, 258
N.E.2d 652 (1970); Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa
1970); Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1966); MeCormack v.
Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189
So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966); Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969); Bran-
denburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973); Kohler v.
Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971); Shoshone Coca Cola Bottling Co. v.
Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 420 P.2d 855 (1966); Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 110 N.H.
36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965);
Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1
Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92 (1965), aff'd, 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966);
Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1965); Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc.,
241 Ore. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966); Ritter v.
Narragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971); Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., .87
S.D. 196, 205 N.W.2d 104 (1973); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240
(1966); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); Ulmer v. Ford Motor
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have joined the movement to adopt the strict tort liability principles set
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A. 3 In so doing,
they have undertaken to hold those engaged in the business of selling prod-
ucts strictly liable to the consuming public for physical harm caused by
defective products. 4
Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55
(1967). States adopting strict liability by statute are Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 221
(West Cum. Supp. 1978); and South Carolina, S.C. CODE § 15-73-10 (1976).
Some states have inferentially adopted strict liability. See Cosrell v. Altec Indus. Inc., 335 So.
2d 128 (Ala. 1976); Schenfeld v. Norton Co., (Colo.), 391 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1968); Piercefield
v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instru-
ment Co., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963); Wasik v. Borg, (Vt.), 423
F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1970).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]
states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relationship with the seller.
4. The public policy considerations underlying the adoption of strict liability principles for
defective products are enumerated in Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162
Mont. 506, 514-15, 513 P.2d 268, 273 (1973), citing Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 12 Ariz.
App. 32, 37-38, 467 P.2d 256, 261-62 (1970) (Jacobsen, J., concurring) as follows:
(1) The manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against their recur-
rence, which the consumer cannot do. Restatement, supra, comment c.
(2) The cost of injury may be overwhelming to the person injured while the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and be distributed among the public as a
cost of doing business. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., [59 Cal. 2d 57], 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
(3) It is in the public interest to discourage the marketing of defective products.
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, supra.
(4) It is in the public interest to place responsibility for injury upon the manufac-
turer who was responsible for its reaching the market. Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., supra.
(5) That this responsibility should also be placed upon the retailer and wholesaler of
the defective product in order that they may act as the conduit through which
liability may flow to reach the manufacturer, where ultimate responsibility lies.
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., [61 Cal. 2d 256], 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168
(1964).
(6) That because of the complexity of present day marketing processes and their
secretiveness, the ability to prove negligent conduct by the injured plaintiff is al-
most impossible. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, supra.
(7) That the consumer does not have the ability to investigate for himself the
soundness of the product. Santor v. A and M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207
A.2d 305 (1965).
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The initial theories upon which strict liability was implemented were lim-
ited in their reach, however, to defendants who were in the "business of
selling products." 5  As a result, a vital part of the development of strict
liability law has centered on the questions of which defendants fit within the
definition of one who "sells" products, 6 and whether other defendants
should also be included. 7 Despite the increased willingness of courts to
expand the concept of seller to extend laterally across the chain of distribu-
tion, encompassing the many parts of the marketing enterprise, the princi-
ples of strict liabilty rarely have been applied in the context of the franchise
system of marketing practice. 8 Even though the franchise licensor generally
may be the cornerstone of a significant consumer enterprise, directing the
(8) That this consumer's vigilance has been lulled by advertising, marketing devices
and trademarks. Concurring opinion, Lockwood, J., Nalbandian v. Byron Jackson
Pumps, Inc., 97 Ariz. 280, 399 P.2d 681 (1965).
5. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at § 402A(1)(a).
6. Early attempts by courts define the "seller" generally limited liability to those business
entities more traditionally associated with the sale and manufacture of consumer products. See,
e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962);
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 I!. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) (manufacturers); Canifax v.
Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965); Dunham v. Vaughn &
Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 I11. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E.2d 684 (1967), affd, 42 Il1. 2d 339, 247
N.E.2d 401 (1969); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Webb
v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966) (wholesalers); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61
Cal. 2d 356, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 I11. 2d 612,
210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 I11. App. 2d 315, 229
N.E.2d 684 (1967), aff'd, 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates,
Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967) (retailers); but cf. Ellis v. Rich's Inc., 233 Ga. 573, 212
S.E.2d 373 (1975) (Georgia remains the only jurisdiction which shields the retailer from strict
liability); Clark v. Bendix Corp., 42 App. Div. 2d 727, 345 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1973); Suvada v. White
Motor Co., 32 I11. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) (manufacturers of component parts).
7. A wealth of case law has addressed the extension of the concept of "seller" to reach
additional defendants who are neither manufacturers nor sellers in a technical sense but who
are unique members of the American business scene. See, e.g., Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car
Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1971); Crowe v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 74 I11. 2d 10, 383
N.E.2d 951 (1978); Cintrone v. Hertz Leasing & Rental Serv. Co., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965) (lessors); Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970); Thompson v.
Reilly, 211 So. 2d 537 (Miss. 1968) (commercial licensor of coin operated laundry machines);
Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969); Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) (builders engaged in the mass production
of homes); Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969); Carpenter v. Best's
Apparel, Inc., 4 Wash. App. 439, 481 P.2d 924 (1971) (hybrid partaking of incidents of sale and
service for hair products). But cf. Nickel v. Hyster Co., 412 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1978) (doctrine of
strict liability does not encompass providers of services including repairers of products). See also
note 37 infra and related text for discussion of extension of strict liability to trademark licensors.
8. The U.S. Dept. of Commerce defines franchising as
a form of marketing or distribution in which a parent company customarily grants an
individual or a company the right, or privilege, to do business in a prescribed man-
ner over a certain period of time in a specified place. The parent company is
termed the franchisor; the receiver of the privilege, the franchisee; and the right, or
privilege, the franchise.
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flow of consumer goods into the stream of commerce for profit, 9 its licensing
arrangements 10 have effectively insulated the franchisor from strict liability
for injuries sustained by customers of the franchisee. "
In Kosters v. Seven-Up Co., 12 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, in a case of first impression, examined the unsettled area of
franchisor liability and determined that a franchisor could be held liable for
injuries to one of its franchisee's customers even though the franchisor did
not design, manufacture, or sell the product that caused the injury. 13 The
court held that a franchisor's sponsorship, management, and control of the
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.
847 (1978). See generally Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEX. L. REv. 650
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown]. See also Kosters v. Seven-Up Co., 595 F.2d 347, 352 (6th
Cir. 1979).
9. By 1983, total franchise sales are projected to reach $437 billion, reflecting an annual
compound growth rate of about 10 percent [from 1973]. The following table illustrates the sig-
nificant growth of sales from franchises:
Franchising: Trends and Projections 1973-79
(in billions of current dollars)
Percent Percent
change change
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977' 1978 1977-78 1979 2  1978-79
Sales
Total .......................... 168.8 173.4 189.8 221.6 253.4 274.4 8 298.6 9
Conpany- d ........... 24.1 26.2 28.8 32.8 38.1 41.5 9 44.5 7
Franchisee-owned ......... 144.7 147.1 161.0 188.8 215.2 232.9 8 254.1 9
Estimated.
' Forecast.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INDUSTRY AND TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUT-
LOOK 1979 500 (1979).
The profits reaped by the franchisor often reflect a two-fold financial benefit with income
accruing in the form of royalty payments under the licensing agreements and from the sale of
necessary ingredients to its franchisee. See City of Hartford v. Associated Constr. Co., 34 Conn.
Supp. 204, 384 A.2d 390 (1978); note 52 and accompanying text infra.
10. The franchise licensing agreement closely regulates the relationship between the fran-
chisor and franchisee. It may specify, for example, standards of quality, fixed prices, and fran-
chisee training. It may also guarantee exclusive sales territory, require that certain supplies and
services be purchased from the franchisor, and provide for uniform advertising. Its purpose is to
protect the trademark or trade name through standardized operations and appearance, and es-
tablish control over the franchisee. Note, Liability of a Franchisor for Acts of the Franchisee,
41 S. CAL. L. REv. 143, 144-46 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Liability of a Franchisor].
11. In addition, the absence of case law assessing these principles in context of franchising
has generally reinforced this insulation. It would seem that the recent rapid growth of the
franchise system of marketing in place of the direct marketing of goods by the trademark owners
has resulted in a lagging case law relating to franchisors' liabilities. See generally Brown, supra
note 8. The absence of judicial precedent became conspicuous in the recent opinion of the
Connecticut Superior Court in City of Hartford v. Associated Constr. Co., 34 Conn. Supp. 204,
384 A.2d 390 (1978). The court, in acknowledging the emerging realities of the commercial
marketplace, stated: "The marketplace is the common denominator of franchising as a fact and
strict tort liability as a law, and two were bound to join in issue for resolution by the court." Id.
at , 384 A.2d at 393.
12. 595 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Seven-Up].
13. Id. at 353.
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system for distributing products places the franchisor in the position of a
supplier of the product for purposes of tort liability. 14 The Seven-Up hold-
ing, extending the concept of seller to include franchisors, was not based
upon the underlying policy considerations of strict liability, 15 but upon the
franchisor's control over the operation of the marketing system that pro-
duced the injury causing product. 16 The result is a cautious extension of
strict liability principles to reach the franchisor where it has retained some
undetermined amount of control. 17
The purpose of this Note is to examine the Seven-Up decision in light of
the policy based reasoning which preceded it in other jurisdictions. Also, the
extension of the concept of seller to include franchisors will be compared to
the law extending strict liability to trademark licensors and to the definition
of a seller in the Illinois Products Liability Act. Finally, the impact of the
decision will be discussed.
SEVEN-UP's FACTS AND REASONING
In Kosters v. Seven-Up, the plaintiff, a young woman, was injured when a
bottle of 7-Up slipped from the end of a sixpack carton of 7-Up beverage and
shattered, and a piece of glass struck her in the eye. 18 After settling her
claim against the bottler, the carton manufacturer, and the grocer for
$30,000, 19 plaintiff brought an action 20 against the franchisor, the Seven-Up
Company, alleging that it should be held strictly liable in tort for injuries
caused by the defectively designed carton. 21 The trial court charged the
14. Id.
15. See generally note 2 supra.
16. 595 F.2d at 353.
17. Id. at 353, n.22.
18. Plaintiff was carrying the carton under her arm while approaching the checkout counter
of a grocery store when the accident occurred. Id. at 350.
19. The grocer was the seller of the bottles which were packaged in an over-the-crown
cardboard wrap. The wrap [carton] was manufactured by Olinkraft, Inc., on an automatic
machine leased by the bottler, Brooks Bottling Company [hereinafter Brooks], a franchisee of
the Seven-Up Company [hereinafter Seven-Up]. Id.
Brooks is a franchise of Seven-Up under an agreement whereby it is the exclusive bottler of
7-Up products distributed in 52 counties of Michigan. Brooks bought an extract from Seven-
Up, to which it added sugar, water, and other ingredients to produce the finished beverage.
This beverage was then placed in bottles purchased by Brooks from the bottle producers and
packaged in cartons selected and purchased by Brooks, after receiving Seven-Up's approval,
from carton manufacturers among whom was Olinkraft, Inc. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 1,
Kosters v. Seven-Up Co., 595 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1979).
20. The case was first tried, on diversity grounds, before a jury in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Michigan. 595 F.2d at 348.
21. The plaintiff's case was premised on five related theories of liability. These included one
negligence theory, one contract theory, and three strict liability theories. This Note will focus
on the plaintiff's theory that she may recover from a franchisor for "breach of implied warranty
of fitness" if the product, the 7-Up carton, was defective. See 595 F.2d at 350. Michigan has
inferentially adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts' doctrine of strict liability for defective
products "under the guise" of the implied warranty theory. Id. at 351 n.6. See Continental Cas.
1979] 1109
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jury that it could find that Seven-Up was a "manufacturer" or "seller" for
purposes of imposing strict liability if it could find that Seven-Up controlled
the "approval or disapproval of the entry in the Channels of Commerce" of
the beverage, 7-Up, "including the totality of the advertising on the carrier"
(carton). 22
On appeal, Seven-Up argued that the trial court erred in extending the
theories of strict liability to a franchisor, when it seemed clear that the fran-
chisor had neither designed, manufactured, nor sold the product in ques-
tion. 21 Seven-Up also objected to its characterization as a seller or man-
ufacturer simply because of its approval of the defective carton design. 24
The court of appeals 25 held that the franchisor could be liable to an in-
jured consumer for breach of implied warranty of fitness if it consented to
the distribution of a defective product bearing its name. 26 Liability, the
court reasoned, would arise from a combination of four factors: the risk
created by the franchisor's approval for distribution of unsafe products, the
franchisor's ability to prevent the loss, the consumer's lack of awareness of
the danger, and the consumer's reliance on the trade name. 27 The Seven-
Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 327 F. Supp. 720, 723 (E. D. Mich. 1970), See also Piercefield v.
Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 89-99, 133 N.W.2d 129, 135 (1965); Comment, Products
Liability in Michigan: Implied Warranty, Strict Tort or Both?, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 1558, 1564,
1573-74 n.108, 1580 (1969).
The question of whether the product, 7-Up, included the defective carton in which it was
carried was not an issue in the case. It is, however, generally held that the product includes the
packaging or container. See cases cited in Wade, supra note 1, at 849.
22. 595 F.2d at 350 n.I. Regarding the issue of the franchisor's liability as a seller or man-
ufacturer of products, the trial court instructed the jury, in part, as follows:
If you find that Seven-Up controls the approval or disapproval of the entry into the
channels of commerce of the product Seven-Up, the bottles-the bottle carriers,
including the totality of advertising on the carriers, then you may find that Seven-
Up is a manufacturer and seller, such that it is liable for an implied warranty of
fitness for its product.
Brief for Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant at 10, Kosters v. Seven-Up Co., 595
F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1979).
23. See note 19 supra.
24. There was evidence that the carton design in question was approved by the Seven-Up
Company pursuant to its franchise agreement with the bottler. See 595 F.2d at 355 n.27 for
relevant sections of the franchise agreement. Seven-Up, however, contended that its approval of
the cartons was only of the "graphics" and to ensure that its trademark was properly displayed.
Id. at 350.
25. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit interpreted the theories of tort liability
under Michigan law in deciding whether an injured purchaser is entitled to recover against the
franchisor of a product. Id. at 349. See note 21 supra.
26. Despite the court's ruling that Seven-Up could be held liable as a supplier or seller of
the defective product, the case was reversed and remanded'for a new trial based on other
liability issues successfully argued by defendant Seven-Up Co. These issues centered on errone-
ous jury instructions regarding inherently dangerous activity, opportunity to change design, and
third-party beneficiary claims, which taken together constituted reversible error at the trial
court level. 595 F.2d at 353-56.
27. 595 F.2d at 353. The court found that these factors have been relied on in previous
Michigan decisions in determining who may be held liable for breach of implied warranty in
1110
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Up court, however, relied primarily on the franchisor's "control" over the
system for distributing its products, and the public's assumption that it does
in fact "control and vouch for" 28 the products as the basis for extending
liability to the franchisor for injuries to a customer of its franchisee. 29
AN ANALYSIS OF SEVEN-UP IN LIGHT OF PRIOR CASE LAW
The Seven-Up decision is best understood when viewed against the
backdrop of prior case law extending strict liability principles to trademark
licensors. In these cases, the trademark licensor can be said to hold an
analogous, if not identical, position in the marketing enterprise to the fran-
chise licensor. 30
A line of decisions that were not decided upon strict liability principles,
nor related solely to the sale of products, emerged over the past decade and
focused upon the franchisor as owner of a popular trade name. In these cases
the combination of the popular trademark and central advertising were held
to give the consumer the impression that he or she was dealing with a cen-
trally managed organization when in fact the injury was caused by dealings
with the franchisee, or trademark licensee. 31 The liability of the franchisor
other products liability situations. Note, however, that the cases cited do not necessarily lend
support to the extension of the concept of "seller" to include the franchisor under strict liability
doctrine or policy. See id. at 353 u. 2 1. In fact, a close analysis of the Michigan decisions from
which the court drew the four central factors reveals that some of these cases are grounded on
theories at variance with strict liability doctrine. See, e.g., Livesley v. Continental Motors
Corp., 331 Mich. 434, 49 N.W.2d 365 (1951) (a case based on negligence theory); Serijanian v.
Associated Material & Supply Co., 7 Mich. App. 725, 151 N.W.2d 345 (1967) (a case decided
on sales theories of implied warranty of fitness and merchantability under the Uniform Sales
Act), See also Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970)
(the court approved of strict liability concepts but rejected the "jargon" of strict liability).
28. 595 F.2d at 353.
29. See note 60 and accompanying text infra. The court declines to address the question of
whether the judge or jury should decide the sufficiency of control to justify the liabilities based
on implied warranty, although the trial court submitted the question to the jury in this case.
See 595 F.2d at 353 n.22.
30. See generally Brown, supra note 8, at 659. The sale by the franchisor to the franchisee
of a license to use the trademark is an essential ingredient in the franchise relationship. Liability
of Franchisor, supra note 10, at 147.
31. See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, Inc., 582 F.2d 781 (3d Cir. 1978)
(fi-anchisor of drug store held liable under doctrine of respondeat superior for death caused by
druggist's faulty prescription); Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1971) (Texaco held
liable under apparent authority or agency by estoppel for a defective used car sold and serviced
by an attendant at its franchised dealership displaying "the Texaco star"); Clark v. Texaco, Inc.,
55 Mich. App. 100, 222 N.W.2d 52 (1974) (involvement of "the man who wears the star" was
substantial enough to justify application of agency by estoppel); Johnson v. American Oil Co., 51
Mich. App. 646, 215 N.W.2d 719 (1974) (Standard Oil's national ad campaign promoting its
products included slogan "you expect more from Standard and you get it" could make it liable
for acts of franchisee under agency or estoppel by apparent authority). See generally Liability of
a Franchisor, supra note 10.
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was based on the doctrines of respondeat superior, apparent authority, and
agency by estoppel. 32 In Seven-Up the court distinguished these agency
decisions, correctly recognizing that they are not applicable in the context of
products liability doctrine. 33 Ironically, prominent among the factors consid-
ered by the Seven-Up court were the consumer's reliance on the trade
name, giving the impression of the franchisor's responsibility for the product,
and the franchisor's control of the marketing. These factors are closely
aligned to the issues considered central to the cases decided upon agency
doctrine. 34
Although agency principles have permitted courts to extend vicarious lia-
bility to trademark licensors for tortious acts of their licensees, these princi-
ples have been formally abandoned in the general context of strict liability
for defective products. 35 Judicial efforts to place strict tort liability for de-
fective products upon the production and marketing enterprises responsible
for placing such goods in the stream of commerce have dictated this depar-
ture from agency considerations. 36 The result has been a policy based ex-
tension of the concept of the seller to include the trademark licensor as a
proper party defendant in strict liability actions.
32. Under the doctrines of respondeat superior, apparent authority, and agency by estoppel,
a: principal is subject to liability for tortious conduct of a servant or agent. The Restatement
(Second) of Agency observes that the liability under respondeat superior is normally based on
the fact that the tort is brought about in the course of an undertaking for the benefit, and
subject to the right, of the principal to control his servant or agent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 216, Comment a (1957). Likewise, a principal is subject to liability for torts resulting
from a third party's reliance upon, or belief in, statements or conduct within an agent's apparent
authority. See id. §§ 8, 219(2)(d), 265. Similarly, the doctrine of agency by estoppel holds the
principal liable for transactions entered into by third parties in belief that the principal au-
thorized them where the principal has intentionally or carelessly caused the belief, or knowing
the belief he does not take reasonable care to give notice of the lack of authority. Id. § 141,
Comment b. For apparent authority distinguished from estoppel, see id. § 8, Comment d.
33. 595 F.2d at 352. In Seven-Up, the court points out that the franchisor's liability under
the agency doctrines is a "different question" which may arise in other franchising contexts. Id.
34. Reliance on the trade name as the indicia of authority is a central issue in cases decided
upon agency principles. See cases cited in note 31 supra. See also Sanders v. Clark Oil Refining
Co., 57 Mich. App. 687, 226 N.W.2d 695 (1975). The amount of control retained by the fran-
chisor over the franchise operations is also the focal point of vicarious liability discussion. See
Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, Inc., 582 F.2d 781 (3d Cir. 1978). See generally Liability
of a Franchisor, supra note 10.
35. The common law theories of negligence and agency, of course, have been formally
abandoned by the adoption of the principles and language of section 402A. Nonetheless, these
common law principles have not been altogether excised from court reasoning extending strict
liability theory. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
36. See notes 31 & 34 supra. Certainly an agency requirement that plaintiff must show a
reasonable reliance on the indicia of authority or upon the trade name as the sine qua non of
the trademark licensor's liability would work hardship upon the injured consumers in a products
liability setting. The very underlying social policies giving rise to strict liability are a response to
this type of consumer disadvantage. See note 4 supra. See also note 54 infra.
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Four cases aptly illustrate this development. At the forefront, the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals, in Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 37 found a trademark
licensor strictly liable for injuries caused by a defective shell bearing its
trade name. Kasel rejected the requirement of finding a precise legal rela-
tionship as had been advocated by the proponents of agency liability. Instead
the court emphasized the enterprise-stream of commerce approach to strict
liability. 38 Under this theory, the trademark licensor was held liable for its
"participatory connection" 39 for personal profit with the injury producing
product, and with the enterprise that created the consumer demand for
and reliance upon the product. 40 Significantly, the California court resisted
the argument that the defendant's control was to be the paramount focal
point for extending strict liability. 41 Also, unlike the Seven-Up ruling, 42
the Kasel court found that the trial court should have imposed strict liability
upon the defendant as a "matter of law" for its integral connection with the
"composite business enterprise" that placed the defective product into the
stream of commerce. 43
Reaching a result similar to Kasel, a federal district court, in Carter v.
Bancroft & Sons, Co., 44 found its justification for extending strict liability to
a trademark licensor in the language of Section 400 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts. 45 In Carter, a trademark licensor of a clothing manufacturing
process was deemed to be a seller for purposes of imposing strict liability
when the injury producing product carried the defendant's "Ban-Lon"
trademark. 46 The court reasoned that under section 400, there was no dif-
ference between the trademark licensor and a seller for purposes of strict
37. 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972).
38. Id. at 725, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. In Kasel, defendant held a 40% stock ownership in the Mexican corporation which man-
ufactured the product. Defendant was also closely involved in its operations, financing, and
advertising. Yet, the court could impose strict liability without regard to the individual defend-
ant's control, though such control, if it existed, could remain a significant factor. Id. at 725,
101 Cal. Rptr. at 323-24. The court thereby followed previous California decisions utilizing the
enterprise-stream of commerce concept without regard for the amount of an individual defend-
ant's control over the defect in the product. Id.
42. See note 11 supra.
43. 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972).
44. 360 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
45. Id. at 1106-07. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at § 400. This section reads in perti-
nent part: "One who puts out as his own product a chattel manufactured by another is subject
to the same liability as though he were its manufacturer" (emphasis added). The Restatement
further defines the meaning of "one who puts out his own product," stating: "Thus, one puts
out a chattel as his own product when he puts it out under his name or affixes to it his trade
name or trademark." Id. at Comment d.
46. Ban-Lon is a trademark identifying garments and fabrics made according to specification
and quality standards prescribed by the defendant trademark licensor. Carter v. Bancroft &
Sons Co., 360 F. Supp. 1103, 1106 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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liability under section 402A. 47 Although the trademark licensor claimed it
was not involved in the manufacture or sale of the defective product, the act
of licensing the use of the trademark "Ban-Lon" alone was sufficient to raise
the liabilities of section 402A. 48
Further, the Illinois Supreme Court in the recent case of Connelly v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 49 approved the Carter reasoning 50 and applied strict liability
to defendant Uniroyal on the basis that an allegedly defective tire bore its
trademark. 51 The Connelly decision relied on the theory of strict liability to
counter the defendant's argument that absent some participation in the dis-
tribution chain, it could not be assessed with the liabilities of one who "puts
out" products under section 400 of the restatement (second).52  The court
found this argument "wholly irrelevant" 53 to the issues of strict liability
which are based on public policy grounds. 54
In City of Hartford v. Associated Construction Co., 55 the doctrine of en-
terprise liability, expounded by Kasel and later advanced in Connelly, was
applied to a franchisor for injury sustained by the ultimate consumer of its
trademark product. 56 Thus, the City of Hartford decision became the first
case to deal squarely with the status of the franchisor, per se, in the strict
liability context. 57 In that decision, the court drew heavily from Kasel's
emphasis on policy considerations and recognized the realities of the fran-
chise method of marketing that has profited from the sale of the injury pro-
ducing goods. 58 The result is yet another logical extension of strict products
47. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3. See 360 F. Supp. 1103, 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Other cases
have found legal support for the proposition that § 400 incorporates trademark licensors into the
reach of § 402A. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Astra Trading Corp., 439 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Miss.
1977); Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co., 13 Wis. 2d 173, 108 N.W.2d 149 (1961).
48. See 360 F. Supp. 1103, 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
49. 75 III. 2d 393, 389 N.E.2d 155 (1979).
50. Id. at 411, 389 N.E.2d at 163.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 410-11, 389 N.E.2d at 162-63.
53. Id.
54. Id. In Connelly, the court reviews the societal purposes underlying the extension of
strict liability in Illinois. The court concludes that:
A licensor is an integral part of the marketing enterprise, and its participation in the
profits reaped by placing a defective product in the stream of commerce (citations
omitted) presents the same public policy reasons for the application of strict liability
which supported the imposition of such liability on wholesalers, retailers, and les-
sors.
Id. at 411, 389 N.E.2d at 163.
55. 34 Conn. Supp. 204, 384 A.2d 390 (1978).
56. Id. at , 384 A.2d at 397.
57. In addressing the question of franchisor liability the court noted that the claim was
"unique," "without precedent or parallel." Id. at , 384 A.2d at 393. The Seven-Up court
concedes that it is "a new question not generally considered in other jurisdictions." 595 F.2d at
352-53.
58. See note 9 supra.
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liability law to an enterprise within the entity of marketing goods-the fran-
chisor.5 9
Curiously, the Seven-Up court footnotes this precedent as a case relating
to trademark licensors. 60 The court also disregarded the decisions from
Kasel to City of Hartford while it interpreted the products liability law of
Michigan in the context of franchising. Instead, the court drew from the
traditional concepts used by early Michigan courts to analyze whether or not
a particular defendant should be held liable for defective products. 61 In so
doing, the court in fact relied upon theories traditionally associated with
agency principles while it extended the law of strict liability to reach a new
defendant-the franchisor. 62 The problems arising from such reliance in
fact upon traditional concepts are discussed below.
CRITICISM OF SEVEN-UP'S CONTROL BASED ANALYSIS
Products liability law is a fast developing area. All the rules have not yet
been formulated and products liability as it matures, has to shake off vari-
ous impediments associated with traditional concepts, which while relevant
to other problems, are inappropriate for this new area. 63
The use of the franchisor's control as a focal point of liability injects ves-
tiges of the agency principles 64 which may impede the underlying policy
reasons for implementing and expanding strict liability doctrine. 65 Of the
factors considered central to the issue of liability, the court inappropriately
condenses the issues to two. 66 The first is the franchisor's control as evi-
denced by rights contained in the franchise agreement 67 and its actual con-
sent to the distribution of the carton. The second issue considers the con-
sumer's expectation, induced by thefranchisor's conduct, that the franchisor
did in fact control the product. 68 It is submitted that these factors echo the
reasoning of the cases founded on traditional theories of agency and negli-
gence and therefore are an awkward medium for analysis of strict liability
concepts. 69
59. See generally Note, Tort Liability of Trademark Licensors, 55 IoWA L. REV. 693, 706
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Tort Liability].
60. 595 F.2d at 352 n.ll.
61. See note 27 supra.
62. See note 35 supra.
63. Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 416, 244 N.W.2d 873, 877 (1976).
64. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
65. See notes 1, 2, & 54. But see note 41 (discussion of control) supra.
66. The Seven-Up decision is allegedly premised on the combination of four factors, yet the
court appears to have relied primarily on these two. 595 F.2d at 353; note 27 and accompanying
text supra.
67. 595 F.2d at 355 n.27.
68. Id. at 353.
69. The reasonableness of a defendant's conduct should not be an issue in a strict liability
action. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at § 402A(2). In Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams
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The major defect of this control centered analysis is that it results in an
extension of strict liability concepts, incorporating a new defendant into its
doctrinal reach, without first acknowledging the underlying social reasons for
imposing strict liability in the first place. 70 The result may be a logical
extension of liability to the franchisor 71 premised on the wrong reasons.
Practical difficulties also arise because attorneys are not instructed as to
the amount of control needed to fix liability of a franchisor in products liabil-
ity actions. 72 That confusion is compounded by the fact that some control
over the quality of products sold by the franchisee may be inherent in the
very nature of a franchise. 73 The Lanham Trade-Mark Act 74 mandates that
a trademark licensor must exercise active control to make certain that the
licensee's goods conform to set standards in order to retain the use of the
trademark. 75 Although the court observes that franchises are identified by a
trade name and may be associated with a trademark, 76 it fails to recognize
the legal requirements on Lanham Act franchisors-that they control their
products or risk abandonment of one of their most important assets, the
trademark. 77
Another problem with control of the product as the basis for attaching
liability is that it may tend to obfuscate the true focal point in a design
Machine & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, 338 N.E.2d 857 (1975), the Illinois Supreme Court em-
phasized that the major purpose of strict liability is to place the loss on those who create the
risk and reap the profits by placing defective products into the stream of commerce, "regardless
of whether the defect resulted from the 'negligence' of the manufacturer." Id. at 82, 338 N.E.2d
at 860 (emphasis added). See note 1 supra.
70. See note 4 supra.
71. See Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972) ("as
long as the franchisor .. .can be said to be a link in the marketing enterprise which placed a
defective product within the stream of commerce, there is no reason in logic for refusing to
apply strict liability in tort to such an entity." Id. at 725, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 323, quoting Tort
Liability, supra note 59, at 706). Accord, City of Hartford v. Associated Constr. Co., 34 Conn.
Supp. 204, 384 A.2d 390 (1978).
72. 595 F.2d at 353 n.22.
73. See Liability of a Franchisor, supra note 10.
74. Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1946). The Act provides that the
trademark owner may license its use to another related company as long as the mark is not used
to deceive the public and provided the licensor adequately controls the licensee. Failure to
exercise the necessary control may result in abandonment and loss of the trademark. Liability of
a Franchisor, supra note 10.
75. See Lahart, Control-The Sine Qua Non of a Valid Trademark, 50 TRADE-MARK REP.
103 (1960). The amount of control necessary to prevent abandonment is not specified in the
Lanham Trade-Mark Act. See note 30 supra.
76. 595 F.2d at 352.
77. The result of this failure is more than an analytical problem. If the Lanham Act requires
control for a valid trademark and control is used as the basis for applying strict liability, then
effectively all franchisors who identify their products by trademarks would be held to strict
liability standards. Since most franchisors are associated with a trademark, the court's control
based reasoning could arguably extend strict liability in the majority of cases.
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defect case: the condition of the product itself. 78 The jury should be con-
cerned with the dangerousness of the product designed in a particular way
and not with the reasonableness of the franchisor's actions in consenting to
the distribution of a defective product bearing its name. 79 The Seven-Up
decision, however, declined to remove the issue of control from the province
of the jury8 0 and left the question for further judicial resolution. 8l The
result is that the jury's proper focus upon the condition of the product is
unnecessarily displaced by considerations relating to defendant's control of
the distribution of the product, that are, at least, confusing issues in the
strict liability context. 82
IMPACT OF THE SEVEN-UP DECISION
The Seven-Up decision, if it falls short on doctrinal grounds by premising
the liability of a business entity on its control of the distribution of prod-
ucts, 8 3 has nonetheless drawn important attention to unsettled liability
questions in context of franchising which pervade the law in most jurisdic-
tions. 84 Whether the conceptual hurdle of control will stifle its application
as important precedent in these jurisdictions remains to be seen. The ruling
at least wrestles with the new question of franchisor liability and, in this
regard, effectively extends the concept of seller in context of a strict liability
case to include the franchisor where it has retained some control.
The case illustrates the frustration inherent in the verbalization and utili-
zation of strict liability principles when courts attempt to operate within the
framework of implied warranty doctrine and language structure. 85 Nonethe-
less, the judicial evolution of strict liability doctrine, even in jurisdictions
operating within the language of section 402A, has generally failed to effec-
tively incorporate the franchisor within its reach. This may be a result of the
difficulty arising from the use of section 402A as a functional means of ex-
78. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978). Accord, Ruckner v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 64 II1. App. 3d 770, 798, 381 N.E.2d 715,
735-36 (1978) (Jones, J., dissenting); Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc., 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2424,
380 N.E.2d 653, 660 (1978).
79. See Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974). In Kasel v. Remington Arms
Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972), the court, regarding the issue of defend-
ant's conduct, held that "strict liability in tort is not concerned with ... conduct. It is actually
an expression of policy that once an entity is instrumental in placing a defective product ...
into the stream of commerce, then liability attaches without regard to conduct (fault)." Id. at
733, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (emphasis added).
80, 595 F.2d at 353 n.22.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., note 77 and accompanying text supra.
83. 595 F.2d at 355 n.27.
84. See Brown, supra note 8.
85. See note 21 supra.
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pression of the doctrine of strict liability, 86 combined with continuing judi-
cial reluctance to abandon familiar and broadly applicable common law
theory in the analysis of strict liability. 87 The Seven-Up decision illustrates
this tendency to fall back, not formally but generally, on some common law
principle, such as control, in order to explain an extension of strict liability
law. 88  As a result, Seven-Up's reliance in fact on traditional concepts may
impede its use in other jurisdictions as precedent for extending the concept
of seller to include the franchisor. In this regard it may be incumbent upon
the state legislatures to transcend the constraints of judicial definitions of the
concept of "seller" in order to fully implement the social policies underlying
the strict liability doctrine.
An example of such a statutory redefinition of strict liability concepts is
found in the recently enacted Illinois Products Liability Act. 89 This act
offers a comprehensive definition of the "seller" which would appear to in-
corporate the composite marketing enterprise. 90 Though the franchisor is
not specifically named, it arguably would be included as one who "labels,"
"markets," or is otherwise involved in placing a product in the stream of
commerce. 91 The Connelly 92 ruling, decided since the statutory definition
went into effect, 93 had no difficulty finding a trademark licensor strictly li-
able as a "seller" simply by its status as such. 94 Yet even absent the legisla-
tive redefinition of seller in most jurisdictions to incorporate the franchisor,
the Seven-Up decision along with City of Hartford 95 and the preceding
trademark rulings will stand to put the franchisor on notice that it will be
expected to share the loss suffered by consumers of defective products pro-
duced by the marketing enterprise under its aegis.
CONCLUSION
The growing importance of franchising as a method of marketing consumer
goods has mandated judicial attention to the reach of the strict liability doc-
86.. See generally Kiely, The Art of the Neglected Obvious in Products Liability Cases: Some
Thoughts on Llewellyn's The Common Law Tradition, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 914 (1975).
87. id.
88. For criticism of control as the basis for extending strict liability to the franchisor, see
note 64 and accompanying text supra.
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.2 (West Supp. 1979) states in pertinent part: "'[Sleller'
means one who, in the course of a business conducted for the purpose, sells, distributes, leases,
assembles, installs, produces, manufactures, fabricates, prepares, constructs, packages, labels,




92. 75 I11. 2d 393, 389 N.E.2d 155 (1979).
93. The Illinois Products Liability Act became effective on January 1, 1979; ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 83, § 22.2 (West Supp. 1979).
94. Connelly did not, however, scrutinize the new statutory definition and it remains un-
tested in the Illinois courts. 75 I11. 2d 393, 389 N.E.2d 155 (1979).
95. 34 Conn. Supp. 204, 384 A.2d 390 (1978).
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trine. Before that doctrine is expanded to include a new defendant, how-
ever, the underlying social policy reasons for implementing strict liability
must be understood. If the franchisor fits within the conceptual framework of
strict liability policy by profiting from the sale of consumer products, there is
no logical reason why he or she should not carry the liabilities of a "seller."
The Seven-Up rule is neither premised upon this policy foundation nor
within the doctrinal framework of strict liability in its extension of products
liability law. Nonetheless, the result is encouraging, if doctrinally unsound,
in that it does bring the franchisor within the ambit of those potentially
liable for products that have caused injury to an unwitting consumer.
Thomas Patrick McGarry

